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ABSTRACT
The early experience of the airline industry under deregulation was very much as expected, with 
increased competition and new entrants offering highly competitive rates. However, there are 
approximately 130 airlines operating today, and the industry remains more heavily concentrated than 
it was prior to deregulation. This study reports on concentration in the US airline industry between 
1970 and 2009, as measured by the Hcrfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and Concentration Ratio, 
together with changes in industry costs. The results show a trend of industry-wide reduced costs per 
available seat mile that is negatively correlated with the increased level of industry output over the 
last 30 years and increased concentration, which demonstrate the need for more research into the 
question of scale economies in air transportation.
INTRODUCTION
Prior to passing the Airline Deregulation Act of 
1978, members of Congress wanted to be 
assured that eliminating federal economic 
regulation would result in neither destructive 
competition, nor increased concentration within 
the industry, which could lead to the threat of 
monopoly abuse or increased prices. Research 
presented before Congress provided a very 
convincing argument that neither condition 
would develop (U.S. Senate, 1975; U.S. House, 
1976; White, 1979; Kyle and Phillips, 1985; 
Antoniou, 1991). Moreover, since there was no 
investment in the way required, entry was 
believed to be relatively easy due to low capital 
requirements and the flexibility with which 
equipment could be acquired, reassigned, and/or 
retired (Harper, 1982; Levine, 1987; Dempsey, 
1993). This belief of easy entry was reinforced 
by the concept of Contestable Markets, which 
suggested that the potential threat of entry could 
keep prices down, even in markets with only one 
competitor (Baumol, Bailey, and Willig, 1977; 
Panzar and Willig, 1977; Bailey and Panzar, 
1981). Thus, Congress passed the 1978 
legislation with the belief that it would bring
about an increase in the number of competitors 
and a decrease in the level of industry 
concentration, leading to lower rates and better 
service throughout the airline industry.
The early experience after deregulation was very 
much as expected. There was a rush of new 
entrants into the market, rates became highly 
competitive, and the industry became less 
concentrated. In 1978, there were 33 airlines 
serving U.S. markets (A4A, 1979). In 1979, the 
first year after deregulation, 18 new carriers 
entered the market and another 13 entered the 
following year. By 1985, there were 106 airlines 
operating scheduled service in the US. (A4A, 
1986). By the end of the decade, however, many 
of the new carriers had exited the market and the 
industry was more concentrated than ever (Kahn, 
1988; Borenstein, 1992; Rakowski and Bejou, 
1992; Dempsey, 1993; Brucckner and Spiller, 
1994; Goetz and Sutton, 1997). This led Alfred 
Kahn, former Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics 
Board and one of the strongest proponents of 
deregulation, to question the outcome of the 
1978 legislation (Kahn, 1988). Others actually 
called for re-regulation of the industry
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(McGinley, 1989; Dempsey, 1990; Nomani and 
Barrett, 1990). However, there was continued 
belief in the positive results of deregulation and 
strong support for the new environment 
(Gattuso, 1986; GAO, 1991; TRB, 1991), so no 
action was taken.
Throughout the 1990s, the trend toward fewer, 
larger carriers continued due to bankruptcies and 
mergers (TRB, 1999; DOT, 2001); however, new 
competitors continued to enter the market, and 
the overall number of carriers increased. By 
1997, there were 99 airlines servicing U.S. 
markets (A4A, 1998), compared to just 66 in 
1991 (A4A, 1992). With the new millennium 
came additional carriers, and in 2003, 150 
airlines were providing service to U.S. markets 
(A4A, 2004). As mergers and bankruptcies 
reduced the number of carriers, they were 
replaced in part by new ones. In 2004, there 
were only 139 carriers, but by 2008 the number 
was back up to 150 (A4A, 2006, 2009). Still, 
questions regarding concentration in the airline 
industry have continued, together with persistent 
calls for re-regulation (Senate, 2001; Staff, 2001; 
USDOJ, 2001; Isadore, 2007; McGee, 2008; 
Lowy, 2010).
Increasing levels of industry concentration seem 
contradictory to increasing numbers of 
competitors, but studies noting levels of industry 
concentration have not been published recently. 
Yet levels from the late 1980s and early 1990s 
appear to remain valid since complaints against 
the industry continue to link bankruptcies and 
merger activity to industry concentration and 
“unreasonable” fares and poor service (GAO, 
2006; Isadore, 2007; McGee, 2008; Lowy,
2010). However, questions arise as to whether 
these concerns are justified. Moreover, it is 
important to know whether the levels of 
concentration in the airline industry have 
continued to increase, or if the new carriers 
entering the market in recent years have led to 
reductions.
This study reports on changes in industry 
concentration in the U.S. airline industry
between 1975 and 2009. This study also reports 
on changes in industry costs and revenues over 
this period. The following section provides a 
brief overview of the two most popular measures 
of industry concentration, those used in this 
study, and a review of previous studies of 
concentration in the airline industry. This is 
followed by a description of the data, and then 
the results of the analysis are presented. Finally, 
conclusions and suggestions for future research 
are discussed.
MEASURING INDUSTRY 
CONCENTRATION
The concept of industrial concentration has been 
studied extensively over the years, and many 
measures have been proposed. Bikker and Haaf 
(2002) reviewed 10 different measures that had 
been used in studies of concentration in the 
banking industry. The two most common 
measures include basic concentration ratios (CR) 
and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). 
These measures are discussed briefly below, and 
this is followed by a brief review of studies of 
industry concentration in the U.S. airline 
industry.
Concentration Ratios
Basie concentration ratios (CRk) measure the 
proportion of industry revenue earned by the k 
largest firms in the industry. The most frequently 
used values of k are 4 and 8, providing the four- 
firm (CR4) and eight-firm (CR ) measures, 
respectively (Bain, 1951, 1954; Scherer and 
Ross, 1990; Bikker and Haaf, 2002; Snyman, 
2010). Basic concentration ratios are seen as 
inferior to other measures of concentration, such 
as HHI, because they don't take into account the 
behavior of any firms other than the four or eight 
largest. Also, many different distributions of 
those largest firms would result in equivalent 
measures of CR4 and CRs. Despite these 
shortcomings, concentration ratios have been 
found to correlate highly with the HHI (Scherer 
and Ross, 1990) and continue to be used. 
Economists researching concentration ratios 
have predominately looked for critical values of 
measures that are positively correlated with
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higher profitability (Schmalensee, 1987; Bikker 
and Haaf, 2002). The idea being that when large 
firms begin to behave as an oligopoly, their 
profitability tends to increase because the large 
firms can easily see what their competitors are 
charging and charge a similar amount. Several 
different numbers have been proposed as the 
critical value, but for Clothe critical value 
generally is considered to be between 45 and 55 
percent, and for CR it is between 60 and 70 
percent (Bain, 1951; Meehan and Duchesneau, 
1973; Dalton and Penn, 1976).
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is the 
sum of the squared market shares for each firm 
in a given industry (Rhoades, 1993; Naucnberg, 
Basil and Chand, 1997; Bikker and Haaf, 2002). 
This gives proportionally greater weight to firms 
with large market shares and “reflects both the 
distribution of the market shares of the top four 
firms and the composition of the market outside 
the top four firms” (Rhoades, 1993; USDOJ, 
1997).
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is 
generally accepted as a better measure of 
industry concentration than basic CRs, and it is 
the measure used by the U.S. Department of 
Justice (USDOJ) in determining whether a 
proposed merger deserves further investigation 
before approval (USDOJ, 1997). The HHI 
ranges from 0 to 10,000 for industries ranging 
from perfect competition to monopoly. As an 
example, an industry with four firms with the 
following market shares (40, 30, 20, and 10) 
would have a CR4 of 100% and a HHI of 3,000. 
If the industry was more concentrated, as with 
the following market shares (80, 10, 5, and 1), 
the CR, would still be 100%, but the HHI would 
be 6,526. Finally, for a monopoly the CR4 would 
still be 100%, but the HHI would be 10,000.
According to the guidelines set forth by the 
USDOJ and the Federal Trade Commission, an 
industry with an HHI lower than 1,000 is 
considered un-concentrated, and mergers need 
not be analyzed. An industry with an HHI
between 1,000 and 1,800 is considered 
moderately concentrated and mergers that create 
an increase in HFII greater than 100 points raise 
competitive concerns and need to be approved. 
Finally, an industry with an HHI greater than 
1,800 is considered highly concentrated, and 
mergers causing an increase of greater than 50 
points raise competitive concerns (USDOJ, 
1997). As with concentration ratios, the HFII can 
be measured using market shares expressed in 
either dollar terms or physical terms, such as 
units sold or revenue passenger miles (RPM).
STUDIES OF AIRLINE INDUSTRY 
CONCENTRATION
By the end of the first decade of deregulation, it 
was clear that the industry was changing 
dramatically. This prompted a wave of research 
assessing the results of deregulation. Several 
studies analyzed the effects of mergers and 
concentration on fares at the route-level or at 
airports/hubs (Hurdle et al., 1989; Borenstein, 
1990, 1991, 1992; Joesch and Zick, 1990; 
Morrison and Winston, 1990; Abramowitz and 
Brown, 1993; Kim and Singal, 1993). These 
studies revealed mixed results, such that in some 
cases fares were lower in heavily concentrated 
markets and in others fares were higher. What 
was revealed was that other factors must be 
considered together with the level of 
concentration. Others studies challenged the 
Theory of Contestable Markets, noting that firms 
may prevent entry of new carriers without 
lowering prices. This could be accomplished by 
development of Hub-and-Spoke Systems, 
Frequent Flyer Programs, Computerized 
Reservation Systems, Travel Agent Commission 
Overrides, and control at "Fortress Hubs” of 
airport slots and gates (Levine, 1987;
Borenstein, 1989, 1992; Fawcett and Farris,
1989; Hurdle ct al., 1989; Evans and Kessides, 
1993b; Joesch and Zick, 1994).
Very few studies reported concentration at the 
industry level, and most of these studies were 
conducted during the wave of research that 
assessed the effects of deregulation at the end of 
the first decade of experience; very little
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attention has been given to industry-level of 
concentration in recent years. Rakowski and 
Bejou (1992) showed that in 1977, the largest 15 
airlines controlled over 95 percent of the market 
in terms of passenger revenues. The largest 8 
controlled nearly 80 percent, and the largest four 
controlled over half. By 1985, those numbers 
were down to 91, 71, and 41, respectively. 
However, by 1989 the concentration ratios were 
back up above 1977 levels with the largest 15 
carriers controlling 99 percent, the largest 8 with 
over 91 percent, and the largest 4 at nearly 55 
percent.
Borenstein (1992) reported the CR4, CRS, and 
HHI for 1977, 1982, 1987, and 1990. The 4-firm 
ratios were 56.2, 54.2, 64.8, and 61.5, for 1977, 
1982, 1987, and 1990, respectively. The 8-firm 
ratios were 81.1, 80.4, 86.5, and 90.5, for those 
same years, and the HHIs were 1060, 930, 1230, 
and 1210, respectively. Evans and Kessides 
(1993a) reported measures of concentration for 
the fourth quarters of 1978-1988. The CR4 
decreased from the 4th quarter of 1978 to a low 
of 38.4 by the 4th quarter of 1985; however by 
the 4th quarter of 1988, it was back up to 45.5. 
The CRX fell from 77.6 in 1978 to a low of 40.7 
in 1985 and then increased to 78.0, its highest 
level up to that point. The HHI fell from 930 in 
the 4th quarter of 1978 to a low of 630 in 1985, 
and rose steadily through 1988 to 870.
Brueckncr and Spiller (1994) showed a similar 
pattern of change in industry concentration as 
measured by Revenue Passenger Miles. They 
reported the CR4 as 59.1, 53.6, and 59.1 for 
1979, 1985, and 1988, respectively. Clearly, the 
pattern was well established. The initial response 
to deregulation was the entry of several new 
carriers and more extensive competition, but by 
the end of the decade, most of the new carriers 
were gone, and the industry was more heavily 
concentrated than it was prior to deregulation. 
Mergers and bankruptcies have continued to 
raise the ire of consumers and public policy 
makers (Senate, 2001; Staff, 2001; US DOT, 
2001; Isadore, 2007; McGee, 2008; Lowy,
2010), but little is known about the actual levels
of concentration in the industry and its 
relationship to overall fare levels and costs.
DATA
The data used in this analysis were obtained 
from the annual reports published by the Airlines 
for America (A4A). These reports, dating back 
to 1937, report information on the general state 
of the industry such as total revenue, expenses, 
revenue passenger miles (RPM), available seat 
miles (ASM), and names of all U.S. carriers with 
scheduled passenger service. In addition to this 
industry-wide information, similar financial and 
production information is reported for the largest 
carriers each year dating back to 1970 (A4A, 
2009). Table 1 provides an overview of the U.S. 
airline industry with respect to the number of 
carriers, total passenger revenue, operating profit 
and four measures of industry concentration for 
the past 40 years. To show trends in pricing and 
cost data, it was necessary to adjust dollar 
figures for inflation. This was accomplished by 
dividing by the implicit price deflator (IPD) as 
reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(2011). The specific IPD used was based on 
annual GDP with a base year of 2005.
NUMBER OF CARRIERS
An expected result of airline deregulation was an 
increase in the number of carriers serving the 
U.S. scheduled passenger service market 
because of reduced barriers to entry. Figure 1 
shows that the number of carriers has increased 
dramatically since deregulation. Between 1978 
and 1985, there was a significant increase in the 
number of carriers with new entrants into the 
market; however, during that period there were 
also many small carriers that exited the market. 
By 1985, 9 of the 34 airlines that existed in 1978 
and 11 of the 17 that entered the market in 1979 
had exited the market. The number of carriers 
peaked in 1985, declined through 1991, and has 
trended upward through 2009 with a few minor 
declines.
With this significant growth in the number of 
carriers, one would expect to see a 
corresponding decrease in the concentration of
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TABLE 1:
INDUSTRY OVERVIEW
Year Number
of
Carriers
Passenger
Revenue
(S Billions)
Operating
Profit
(S Billions)
RPM
(Billions)
ASM
(Billions)
CR4 CR8 Mill Gini
Index
1970 39 31.3 0.2 131.7 264.9 57 83 1,076 78
1971 36 32.2 1.2 135.7 279.9 56 82 1,037 76
1972 34 34.9 2.2 152.4 287.4 57 83 1,056 75
1973 35 36.5 2.1 162.0 310.6 54 83 1,024 76
1974 33 38.7 2.4 162.9 297.0 53 83 1,015 74
1975 34 36.8 0.3 162.8 303.0 53 82 995 74
1976 36 40.2 2.0 179.0 322.8 53 82 992 76
1977 34 43.1 2.4 193.2 345.6 52 81 978 74
1978 34 46.5 3.4 226.8 358.8 53 81 1,004 74
1979 50 52.0 0.5 262.0 416.0 50 79 901 81
1980 61 58.7 -0.5 254.2 431.2 49 80 920 83
1981 86 58.5 -0.8 248.8 432.5 47 76 853 87
1982 93 55.1 -1.3 259.0 424.9 47 77 854 87
1983 95 56.8 0.5 281.3 463.4 48 76 860 86
1984 95 61.8 3.6 304.5 514.0 46 74 817 86
1985 106 63.7 2.3 335.9 547.0 45 73 782 88
1986 98 63.6 2.1 366.3 606.8 48 74 833 87
1987 93 69.3 3.8 404.3 648.4 51 84 989 90
1988 77 75.4 5.2 423.3 648.7 53 85 1,027 89
1989 71 77.2 2.7 432.7 684.4 57 87 1,094 89
1990 67 80.9 -2.6 457.9 733.4 57 88 1,111 89
1991 66 76.2 -2.4 447.8 715.0 63 90 1.230 89
1992 70 78.0 -3.1 478.1 751.8 69 94 1,407 92
1993 80 81.7 1.8 489.1 770.8 69 93 1,407 92
1994 88 81.1 3.5 518.2 783.8 68 91 1,347 92
1995 95 85.1 7.2 540.4 806.6 67 89 1,312 92
1996 97 88.2 7.5 578.4 834.7 66 89 1,280 92
1997 99 93.9 10.2 605.4 860.6 66 89 1,278 92
1998 98 94.6 10.9 619.5 874.2 65 89 1,273 92
1999 94 96.9 9.1 651.6 917.8 64 89 1,233 92
2000 96 105.5 8.0 692.5 956.5 62 88 1,185 91
2001 100 89.2 -11.1 651.7 930.5 64 89 1,244 92
2002 141 79.5 -9.3 639.6 892.7 62 87 1,185 93
2003 150 81.8 -2.3 655.9 893.9 58 83 1,069 92
2004 140 88.5 -1.4 731.9 969.0 57 81 1,029 91
2005 139 93.4 0.3 779.0 1,003.3 55 83 1,028 91
2006 141 98.0 7.3 797.4 1,006.4 54 82 1,007 92
2007 151 100.7 8.7 829.0 1.037.1 53 81 968 91
2008 150 102.8 -3.3 81 1.4 1,020.1 61 83 1,188 92
2009 130 83.2 2.2 769.5 952.2 60 83 1,157 92
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FIGURE 1:
NUMBER OF U.S. AIRLINES 1975-2009
the industry and equality of carriers' market 
share, especially if there were no economies of 
scale. That is, if all carriers, regardless of size, 
had the same costs per unit of output, the 
concentration today should be lower than the 
concentration was in 1975 because the new 
entrants into the market would be able to take 
significant amounts of market share from the 
industry leaders. This is not the case, however, 
and the following sections will illustrate that 
industry concentration and inequality has 
actually increased over this time period.
CONCENTRATION RATIOS
Figure 2 shows a graphical representation of the 
annual four and eight firm concentration ratios 
calculated using market shares measured in both 
dollar sales and units sold between 1975 and 
2009 as well as the most conservative (highest) 
critical values of CRS and the range of critical 
values for CR4. From this figure, it is obvious 
that the airline industry is currently operating 
above these critical values and has been for most 
of, if not all of, the past 35 years. This suggests 
that the industry is behaving as an Oligopoly and 
is a highly concentrated industry. This can be 
further verified by the fact that ticket prices for 
the same lane among the largest airlines are
generally very similar, and when checked 
baggage fees were added in 2009 they were 
added for all of the largest airlines, with the 
exception of Southwest Airlines, which, as of 
2011, doesn't charge a checked baggage fee but 
frequently charges slightly higher ticket prices 
than the other major national airlines. 1 lowever, 
an industry behaving as an oligopoly should 
have higher profitability (Bikker and Haaf, 
2002), and this is not the case in the U.S. airline 
industry, where industry profits per unit of 
output have remained fairly constant over the 
past 40 years.
HERFINDAHL-HIRSCHMAN INDEX
Figure 3 shows the HHI calculated annually for 
the U.S. airline industry from market shares 
measured in terms of both dollar sales and units 
sold. Both methods result in measures of Hill 
that are very similar at every point in the sample. 
This illustrates that the airline industry is 
moderately concentrated and has been for most 
of the past 35 years. It is also clear that when the 
number of carriers was increasing, between 1978 
and 1985, the concentration of the industry was 
decreasing. However, when the number of 
carriers began decreasing between 1985 and 
1991, the concentration increased rapidly, and
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FIGURE 2:
ANNUAL CR4 AND CRs of U.S. AIRLINE INDUSTRY
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did not decrease dramatically as more carriers 
later began to enter the market. Therefore, 
despite the fact that there are between 4 and 5 
times as many carriers today as there were in 
1978, the HHI is actually higher. The large firms 
have increased their market share and the small 
firms are dividing a decreasing percentage of the 
market between them. This indicates that there is 
some reason the large firms are able to increase 
their power, whether it is due to economies of 
scale, scope, or density.
INEQUALITY
When discussing industry concentration, it 
makes sense to also discuss the related concept 
of inequality of the distribution of market share 
of the firms in the industry. A common way to 
measure inequality is the Gini index (Damgaard 
and Weiner, 2000). The Gini index is based on 
Pareto’s law and is the ratio of the area between 
a diagonal representing equal distribution and 
the Lorenz curve and the area below a diagonal 
representing equal distribution. In the Lorenz 
curve, individuals are ranked by size, and the 
cumulative percentage of carriers is plotted on 
the x-axis against the corresponding cumulative 
percentage of the market on the y-axis. In figure 
4, the Lorenz curve for the U.S. airline industry 
in 2009,
To make computation easier and avoid the 
estimation of a formula for the Lorenz curve, the 
following formula is an unbiased estimator of 
the Gini index if the carriers are ranked by size 
(Damgaard and Weiner, 2000), wherex. is the 
size or market share of each carrier and // is the 
average size of all carriers.
(2)
Figure 5 shows the Gini index tor the U.S. 
airline industry for the past forty years calculated 
using size measured in both passenger revenue 
and RPM. This shows that inequality in the 
industry increased significantly immediately 
following deregulation and has continued to do
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so. If there was no benefit to being a larger 
carrier (no returns to scale or scope), we would 
expect to see the industry approaching a more 
equitable distribution of the market when in fact 
the opposite has been the case. Furthermore, the 
correlation between the Gini index and number 
of carriers is 0.8165, indicating that as the 
number of carriers increases so does the 
inequality in market share between carriers.
These multiple measures of industry 
concentration and inequality were examined to 
clearly illustrate that the concentration of the 
U.S. airline industry has been increasing since 
deregulation despite the fact that there has been 
a substantial increase in the number of firms. 
While this alone, does not indicate economies of 
scale or scope, it certainly raises questions as to 
how the largest firms have been able to maintain 
control of the marketplace and actually increase 
market share w ith the near constant introduction 
of new competitors. One possible explanation 
might be that operating costs per unit of output 
are actually lower for the larger carriers. If this 
explanation is accurate, it would indicate the 
presence of economies of scale, economies of 
scope, or both in the airline industry.
COSTAND REVENUE PER PASSENGER 
MILE (RPM)
Since 1975, there has been an increase in the 
size of the airline industry as a whole. This can 
be measured by revenue (dollar sales). RPM 
(unit sales), or ASM (output). All three measures 
have shown an increasing trend since 1975 and 
can be seen in Figure 6. In order to fit data of 
differing scales on the same graph and show the 
increasing trends more clearly, revenue, RPM, 
and ASM have been indexed with a base year of 
1975 by dividing each year’s value by the value 
from 1975. The revenue values were adjusted for 
inflation before being indexed. Figure 6 clearly 
shows an increasing trend in the size of the U.S. 
airline industry, but it also shows that output and 
units sold have been increasing more rapidly 
than revenue. This is another indication of scale 
economies and shows that costs have risen less 
quickly than output.
FIGURE 4:
CALCULATION OF THE GINI INDEX
FIGURE 5:
GINI INDEX OF U.S. AIRLINE INDUSTRY
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Figure 7 shows the increase in billions of RPM 
sold for what are, as of 2010, the three largest 
airlines in the U.S. (United, American, and 
Delta) for each year between 1975 and 2009. 
This figure illustrates that not only has the entire 
industry been increasing in size, but the largest 
firms have also been increasing. Figure 7 also 
shows that the period from 1979-1985 resulted 
in a relative lack of growth for these three 
carriers while the industry as a whole was 
growing. This lack of growth for the large 
carriers as the industry grew corresponds to what 
was shown in figures 1-3, that the number of 
firms increased in this time period and the 
industry concentration, as measured by CR4,
CRS, and HHI, decreased.
Correlated to the growth of the industry was an 
equally impressive decrease in both expenses 
and revenue per RPM and ASM. This can be 
seen in Figure 8. This figure is based on 
monetary figures, which were adjusted for 
inflation by dividing each year’s observation by
the corresponding I PD. This is another indicator 
that economies of scale or scope may exist in the 
airline industry. The correlation between 
industry output (measured in either RPM or 
ASM) and expenses per RPM is -0.86.
However, the fact that revenue per unit of output 
has decreased at nearly the same rate indicates 
that the carriers do not appear to be acting as 
though they are market leaders in a concentrated 
industry. Actually, the correlation between sales 
per RPM and output is even higher at -0.96, 
indicating that the price of air travel has 
decreased more quickly than the cost of 
providing air travel. For those interested in re­
regulation, this raises the question of whether the 
current state of the industry and competition is 
bad for the consumer. Presumably the role of 
regulation would be to help the consumer and 
maintain competitiveness in the industry. 
However, the industry seems to be lowering 
prices even faster than expenses, suggesting that 
competition is keeping prices low despite high 
levels of industry concentration.
FIGURE 6:
ANNUAL INDEXED MEASURES OF INDUSTRY SIZE (1970=1)
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FIGURE 7:
ANNUAL RPM (BILLIONS) OF 2009’s 3 LARGEST CARRIERS
2000
United
FIGURE S:
REVENUE, EXPENSES, AND PROFIT PER REVENUE PASSENGER MILE
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The bottom line on Figure 8 illustrates the profit 
per RPM, and this measure has stayed fairly 
stable over the past 35 years. In fact, the entire 
industry lost money 11 out of the past 35 years.
If this is a result of destructive competition, 
there may be a need for regulation simply to 
keep the large carriers from losing money or 
requiring governmental monetary intervention to 
avoid bankruptcy. The entire industry has lost 
approximately $9 Billion since 2001. However, 
this is more likely the result of a few large firms 
losing a lot of money rather than all of the major 
carriers losing money. Based on information 
from their annual reports to the SEC, America 
West and U.S. Airways combined, pre-merge, 
and post merge losses since 2001 have totaled 
close to $8 Billion, leading to the conclusion that 
the rest of the industry only lost $1 Billion; this 
includes at least 40 bankruptcies, with at least 12 
of the bankruptcies resulting in the cessation of 
operations.
These findings support reregulation of the airline 
industry in that they provide evidence of 
economies of scale, and a major reason for 
deregulation was a multitude of studies showing 
a lack of scale economies in the industry. The 
industry has concentration ratios indicating that 
it should be behaving as an oligopoly, all 
measures of concentration show increased 
concentration ratios since deregulation, and cost 
per unit of output has steadily decreased as 
output has increased. Contrary to this evidence is 
the fact that price per unit of output has 
decreased even faster than costs. This reduced 
price is beneficial to consumers as long as 
destructive competition does not drive prices 
down so far that the established carriers are 
forced out of business. However, it has been 
pointed out that the majority of industry losses 
over the past 9 years have been the result of two 
carriers who merged.
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
The final piece of evidence that there may be 
economies of scale in the U.S. airline industry is 
the recent abundance of mergers and 
acquisitions. If there are no cost benefits from
increased size of operations, why are there so 
many mergers? The following is an account of 
some of the recent mergers: American Airlines 
purchased the assets of the bankrupt Trans World 
Airlines in 2001. America West and U.S.
Airways (both with recent bankruptcies) merged 
in 2005 and integrated their operations in 2008. 
Delta and Northwest merged in 2008. United 
Airlines and Continental Airlines merged in 
October of 2010. ExpressJet Airlines merged 
with Sky West/ASA in November of 2010.
Finally, Southwest Airlines announced a merger 
with AirTran Airways in September of 2010 
which was finalized May 2, 2011.
While many carriers are merging operations, 
there are also several instances of a single 
holding company owning multiple carriers. This 
would further suggest that the carriers see no 
possibility of economies of scale. However, in 
some cases, these are the same companies that 
were previously mentioned. For example, Delta 
Airlines owns Comair and operates it separately; 
AMR Corporation owns American Airlines, 
American Eagle, and Executive Airlines; U.S. 
Airways Group owns U.S. Airways, Piedmont 
Airline, Inc., and PSA Airlines; and Republic 
Airline Holding owns Frontier, Republic, Shuttle 
America, Chatauqua, and Midwest. This 
indicates that mergers may not be attempts to 
exploit economies of scale but may be due to 
some other rationale.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper is intended to investigate the state of 
the airline industry, show its increasing level of 
concentration, and point out the need for further 
investigation into the existence of scale 
economies. Whether industry concentration is 
measured by concentration ratios or the HHI, the 
U.S. airline industry has been increasing in 
concentration while also increasing in size and 
number of carriers. The fact that large carriers 
can increase market share in the presence of 
increased competition seems to suggest the 
existence of scale economies. Costs per unit of 
output have been steadily decreasing as industry 
output and output of the largest carriers has
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increased. This is yet another indicator that scale 
economies may exist. Finally, some air carriers 
behave as though they will see a benefit from 
merging with other carriers, indicating a belief or 
hope that scale economies exist, while other 
companies own multiple carriers without 
merging operations, indicating that they see no 
benefit from increasing the size of operations.
For this reason alone, it may be time to 
reinvestigate the existence of scale economies in 
the U.S. airline industry, so airline holding 
companies will know if they could expect to see 
reduced cost from merging operations instead of 
operating multiple carriers.
For all of these reasons, the apparent shifts in 
market structure as seen by changes in equality 
in Figure 5, and the recent calls for re-regulation; 
it seems as though there exists a need for further 
investigation into the presence or absence of 
economies of scale and scope in the U.S. airline 
industry. Further validating this argument, is the 
fact that the most recently published study into 
this matter, while published in 2001, used data 
from 1983-1989 (Creel and Farrell, 2001). This 
means that an additional 20 years of available 
data has not been included in any previous 
studies on scale economies in the U.S. airline 
industry. It is time for a thorough study using the 
most up to date information to investigate the 
existence of economies of scale, scope, and 
density.
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